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Abstract 
Background: The Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the Health Services participated in the 
multinational nursing survey RN4CAST as the Norwegian representatives. The items relating 
to nurses` perceptions of patient safety climate have not been assessed in the Norwegian 
setting, which is needed if these items are to be used with certainty regarding their validity 
and reliability.  
Objectives: The main objective of this thesis is to assess the concurrent validity and internal 
consistency of items relating to perceptions of patient safety climate in the Norwegian part of 
the multinational nursing survey RN4CAST. A secondary objective is to identify the main 
challenges associated with identifying causal relationships between safety climate and safety 
outcomes, and discuss these in relation to the survey undertaken in this study. 
Methods: Nurses from two hospital wards completed both the SAQ and the items relating to 
patient safety climate from the RN4CAST survey. Two scaled indexes were created from the 
RN4CAST items, and three analyses were done: 1) Pearson`s correlation coefficient between 
the SAQ and the RN4CAST; 2) Chronbach`s Alpha for internal consistency within the 
RN4CAST items; and 3) Bland-Altman analysis for assessment of agreement.  
Results: The assessment of the two scales created demonstrated high internal consistency 
(Chronbach’s Alpha of .82 and .80, respectively), moderate inter-item correlations, and good 
concurrent validity as measured by Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r= .73 and .78, 
respectively). The results from the Bland-Altman analysis demonstrated reasonably good 
agreement between the two measures of patient safety climate.  
Conclusion: The result of the analyses demonstrates that the two scales are internally 
consistent, there is an association between the scales from RN4CAST and SAQ safety climate 
dimension, and that the level of agreement between the two methods is good. The two scales 
are both found to be validated measures of patient safety climate.   
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1 Introduction  
 
Since the American Institute of Medicine published the report “to Err Is Human”, where they 
estimated the number of adverse events and resulting deaths in the American health care service 
(Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson, 2000), the interest for patient safety has risen. In Norway, it 
have been estimated that 16 per cent of all hospitalized patients were subject for damage 
acquired the hospital in 2010, and of these, 4700 patients died as a result of the damage 
(pasientsikkerhetskampanjen.no). At the same time, due to the demographic changes as 
ageing of the population, the Norwegian Statistical Agency have provided a conservative 
estimate of a shortage of 14.000 nurses in 2030 (Texmon and Stølen, 2009). Hence, there is a 
great need to increase the knowledge on how to plan and organize the health services in a way 
that is at the same time both effective, and ensures patient safety.  
 
Several ongoing projects in Norway attempts to investigate the present status of patient safety, 
and increase the knowledge on this area. The Norwegian part of the multinational RN4CAST 
survey aim at developing knowledge about the relationship between hospitals` organisational 
variables, the management of nursing resources, and patient safety in the Norwegian context 
(project plan Personnel and patient safety, Kunnskapssenteret 2009). Hence, it can be an 
important contributor to the development of knowledge about patient safety aspects in 
Norway, and eventually to contribute to a safer health care service 
The National Patient Safety Campaign was launched in January 2011, aiming at reducing 
patient damages and improve patient safety, both in primary and specialized care. The three 
main aims for this campaign are to reduce patient damages, establish lasting structures for 
patient safety, and to improve the patient safety culture in the health services. Hence, patient 
safety culture is considered a key aspect of safe care. Surveys demonstrate that the patient 
safety culture could affect the treatment of patients, and that it can vary considerably between 
units. Thus, it is considered important to measure how health care staff perceives the safety 
culture in their unit. The results from the patient safety climate assessment undertaken as part 
of the Safety Campaign will guide targeted interventions for improvement of patient safety 
culture and increase the patient safety in the Norwegian health care sector 
(pasientsikkerhetskampanjen.no).  
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1.1 Objections of the thesis 
As the RN4CAST survey is part of a large, multinational study, not all aspects have been 
validated for the Norwegian setting. This thesis will contribute to this exactly, as it is an 
assessment of the concurrent validity, inter-item reliability and inter-rater reliability of the 
items from RN4CAST that relates to patient safety. It will allow the researchers working on 
this study to use these items as measures of nurses’ patient safety climate perceptions with a 
greater level of confidence. This work will contribute to fill the knowledge gap related to 
these items in the Norwegian branch of the RN4CAST survey. I will in the following 
investigate and discuss my main research question; “Can items from question B6 in the 
RN4CAST survey be used as measures of nurses` perceptions of patient safety climate?”  
The research question will be assessed using empirical analyses of survey data from a 
Norwegian hospital, containing the relevant items from the RN4CAST survey, as well as an 
already validated instrument for assessing health care workers` perceptions of patient safety 
climate, the Norwegian version of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (Generic version, short 
form 2006)  
In the process of gathering knowledge about research patient safety culture and climate 
measurements, it became increasingly clear that the notion of patient safety culture is not 
uncontested. For example, it is difficult to see what term best describes the phenomenon as 
there is no clear consensus in the use of concepts (The Health Foundation, 2011a). In many 
cases, safety climate and safety culture are used exchangeable, without discussion and 
definition of the underlying meaning. Further, the causal relationship found between safety 
climate and patient outcomes in single studies have proven difficult to establish in meta-
studies (Ibid.). The Nordic Council of Ministers (2010) states that it is imperative that patient 
safety culture should be linked to other measures of patient safety, such as complications of 
treatment, mortality, and observable safety behaviour such as safe medication. It was thus 
perceived important to assess this issue more in relation to the validation of the patient safety 
climate items.  
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1.2 Thesis’ structure 
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 1 has introduced the thesis. Second, the theoretical 
background will be presented, with emphasis on terms relevant to safety culture and climate, 
patient safety, quality of health care, and the measurement of patient safety climate, Third, the 
design and methods for data collection will be presented. Section 4 presents the analytical 
approach, and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses the statistical findings as well 
as the findings from the literature.  Finally, section 7 concludes the thesis.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
In this chapter, the terms organisational culture and climate, patient safety culture and climate, 
and patient safety will be presented using relevant research and literature. Special attention 
will be given to the measurement of patient safety climate and its relationship to quality of 
health care services.  
2.1 Organisational culture 
According to Edgar Schein (2010),  an organizational culture is defined as 
“a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by the group as it solved its problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think and feel in relation to those problems” (p. 18).  
The research and literature on organizational culture tends to fall within one of two main 
schools. If culture is regarded as something an organization has, it is often assumed that 
culture is something leaders can (and should) change and manipulate in order to achieve 
certain goals. However, if one regards culture as something an organization is, then culture is 
often conceptualized as something that evolves from the actions taken by the group members, 
which is grounded in unconscious values and therefore difficult to assess or change (Davies, 
Nutley and Mannion (2000). Schein’s definition addresses both these perspectives, as culture 
is both viewed as an expression of style, strategy documents, physical environment etc, as 
well as shared, unexpressed values and beliefs (which could be extremely difficult to change). 
Other, broader definitions emphasize that culture is a global phenomenon that encompasses 
the norms, values and beliefs and basic assumptions of an entire organisation (Blegen, Pepper 
and Ross, 2005).  
2.1.1 Three layers or culture 
Following Schein`s framework, any given culture is consisting of three layers. The layers 
refer to the degree of visibility to observers. The first cultural level is the level of artefacts, 
consisting of the observable phenomena that occur when one encounters a new, unfamiliar 
group. Artefacts are, among others, made up by the visible products of the group, i.e. the 
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physical surroundings, language, technology, the group’s style (clothing, behavioural 
manners), its myths and stories told about the organization, and last its expressed list of values 
and its observable rituals and ceremonies. Thus, artefacts are the organization’s observable 
and feelable structures and processes (Schein, 2010).  
Among these artefacts is the group’s “climate”. There is extensive debate about the 
relationship between climate and culture, and whether these in fact are equivalent to each 
other (Zohar, Livne, Tenne-Gazit, Admi, & Donchin, 2007). According to Schein, the climate 
is a manifestation of the group’s culture, as it is better thought of as a product of the 
underlying basic assumptions (2010).   
The second level consists of espoused beliefs and values, created via learning and problem 
solving by the group and its leader. If the solution to certain problems turns out to be 
successful, these solutions or values will gradually be transformed into shared values or 
beliefs, and finally into shared assumptions. One important aspect of this level is that the 
espoused beliefs and values continue to be conscious and are explicitly articulated as they are 
functioning as moral or normative “guidelines” in how the group best should solve key issues, 
and best to train new members of the group how to behave (Schein 2010). Further, one can 
observe deviations from the desired behaviour in the observable behaviour, if the beliefs and 
values providing comfort and meaning to the group are not congruent with effective 
performance. 
The third and final level is the level of basic underlying assumptions. If the suggested solution 
to a problem continues to work repeatedly, what was first a hypothesis ends up being treated 
as reality. The degree of consensus within the group depends on previous success in 
implementing certain beliefs and values. Culture defined as a set of basic assumptions gives 
definitions on what to pay attention to, the meaning of things, the way to react emotionally 
towards events, as well as appropriate actions for situations. These underlying assumptions 
tend to be non-confrontable and non-debatable, and could thus be difficult to change. Thus, 
the essence of a given culture tends to lie in the pattern of underlying basic assumptions 
(ibid.).  
In order to investigate and measure organizational culture, one would have to assess the 
group’s culture at all three levels. The different levels will require different research methods 
to be used, as it could be difficult, for example, to assess unexpressed and unarticulated 
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beliefs and values via a structured survey tool. To do this, qualitative and observational 
methods would be required (Ashkanasy, Broadfoot and Falkus (2000). The most common 
method for assessing organizational culture is using survey tools. When questionnaires are 
used to measure safety culture, the different items measured are organized into scales that 
reflect different dimensions or traits relevant to safety culture. These include among other 
safety climate, teamwork climate and perceptions of management (Deilkås, 2010). As have 
been noted above, it is the climate which is most accessible to observation and measurement. 
Hence, survey measurement of culture can be contested – in fact, it might not be measuring 
culture, but climate. However, in many of these instruments, the term climate is replaced with 
“culture” (Olsen, 2008)  
  
2.2 Organizational climate  
In Guldenmund’s review of research on (safety) culture and climate (2000), attempts to 
identify systematic differences between organizational culture and climate were made. In his 
review, special attention was given to the presence of an eventual underlying theoretical 
model, as this should form the basis for any scientific enterprise. These two terms have been 
used in research with little attention to the concepts’ theoretical and practical underlying 
meaning. His findings demonstrated that historically, the term organizational climate was 
referring to a global, integrating concept, which underlie most organizational events and 
processes (similar to Schein’s definition of culture). Further, the term organizational climate 
has come to mean the more open manifestation of the organization’s underlying culture – 
climate is an expression of the culture (Guldenmund, 2000).  
According to Gershon, Stone, Bakken and Larson (2004), aspects of organisational climates 
are easier to measure due to their tangible nature. This is in accordance with Schein’s 
definition of culture, as climate is an observable expression of the underlying culture. Hence, 
to measure climate has been regarded as a way of measuring culture, as a given group’s 
climate could be perceived as a manifestation of the group’s culture.   
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2.3 Safety culture and climate  
According to Zohar et al (2007), safety climate can be defined as shared employee 
perceptions of how their unit and the organisation at large prioritises safety, especially in 
situations where safety competes with other performance dimensions (e.g. care speed or 
quality of care). As will be described in following parts of this chapter, there is no shared or 
commonly used term for neither patient safety culture nor climate (National Patient Agency 
(2004). Guldenmund (2010,p. 1466), claims that safety culture “..has become a term used.. to 
explain everything related to safety failures that cannot be explained in any other way 
(Guldenmund, 2010) . Further, there has been a continuing debate about the fundamental 
dimensions of which constitutes safety climate (Flin, 2007) . Hence, the generality of these 
constructs have not been established. 
2.3.1 Safety culture and climate in health care 
The efforts to link culture and performance can be linked back to the Hawthorne studies, 
aspects of the social dimensions in groups of workers could be manipulated in order to affect 
employee efforts and performance (Davies, Mannion, Jacobs, Powell, & Marshall, 2007).  In 
the 60s and early 70s, this topic received little attention. This changed when explanations for 
the worldwide success of Japanese factories were sought, and safety culture was identified as 
a major contributor for this success (Wilderom, Glunk and Maslowski (2000).  
The interest for safety culture and climate research has risen since the 1980s. One of the 
focusing events was the Chernobyl accident in 1986, where a lack of safety culture was 
identified as one of the causes for the accident (Mearns and Flin (1999). Since, a plethora of 
researchers have tried to connect safety culture and climate with the organization’s 
performance and quality (Wilderom et al, 2000). The same challenges as in general 
organizational climate and culture research are applicable to research on safety culture and 
climate. Safety culture and safety climate have been used synonymously and interchangeably 
in many of the studies, since the concepts of climate and culture have not been operationalised 
or defined in a proper way, and the construct validity have not been thoroughly established 
(Olsen, 2010), Mearns and Flin 1999), which in turn have resulted in questionable 
methodological quality of some studies (Wilderom et al, 2000). A vast number of different 
definitions, and methods for measuring, safety culture and climate, have resulted in a mass of 
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research lacking a coherent theoretical framework (Wakefield, McLaws, Whitby, & Patton, 
2010).  
According to the UK Health and Safety Commission (1993), safety culture can be defined as  
The safety culture of an organization is the product of the individual and group values, 
attitudes, competencies and patterns of behaviours that determine the commitment to, and the 
style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety programmes. Organizations with 
a positive safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by 
shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive 
measures (cited from Vincent, 2010 p.273).  
This definition is not directly addressing patient safety culture, which is defined by The 
European Network for Patient Safety (EUNetPAS) as 
“An integrated pattern of individual and organisational behaviours, based upon 
shared beliefs and values that continuously seeks to minimise patient harm, which may result 
from the process of care delivery” (Christensen and Bartels, 2010, p.4) pattern   
Common definitions of the term patient safety climate seems to emphasize shared employee 
perceptions of how their unit and organisation prioritises patient safety aspects (see for 
example Zohar et al (2007), or The Health Foundation (2011b). But - there seems to be a vast 
array of different definitions, also in the health care sector (Halligan and Zecevic (2011). The 
many definitions of safety culture could imply that first, the concept of safety culture is not 
fully understood or agreed, and second, that there is a number of important aspects to the 
culture of safety. According to Vincent (2010), these aspects include both how the 
organization reacts to errors after they have occurred, the practice environment in which the 
errors are made (if there is a culture of blame, guilt etc that would impede learning from 
errors as well as effective actions to prevent future errors), if errors are anticipated beforehand 
instead of rather reacted to after they have occurred, and if problems are denied instead of 
acknowledged.  
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2.4 Patient safety  
Safety is considered a core dimension of quality. This is, however, a new way of thinking 
about quality and safety. For example, Maxwell (1984) identified six core dimensions of 
quality, of which safety was not mentioned. In Norway, safety is included in the definition of 
quality, as one of the six core elements that constitutes health care services of high quality 
(Helsedirektoratet, 2010).  
WHO defines patient safety as “freedom for a patient from unnecessary harm or potential 
harm associated with healthcare” ((ICPS), 2004) 
The by now well-known report “To Err is Human” contributed to a large degree to the agenda 
setting of patient safety in health care. This report from the American Institute of Medicine 
estimated that between 44000 and 98000 patients died every year in the US, resulting from 
adverse events and healthcare errors (Kohn, Corrigan and Donaldson (2000). Following this 
report were a number of studies from both the US, UK and other countries, demonstrating that 
between 3 and 17 % of hospital admissions resulted in a an adverse event (Flin, 2007). In 
Norway there is a lack of systematic reporting and measurement of adverse events, hence the 
estimates for the numbers of deaths and injuries have been based on international studies. 
Peder F. Hjort estimated in the book “Uheldige hendelser i helsetjenesten” that the 
corresponding figure for Norway in 2005, is 4000 deaths (2007).  
Initially, the solution to these problems focused on administrative and technical aspects of the 
care process, such as the development of patient safety units in hospitals, but since these 
measures did not result in the expected changes, a call for systemic and organisation-level 
changes were raised (Zohar et al., 2007). There is now a widespread focus on patient safety 
culture, and attempts to link patient safety culture to safety outcomes are made.  
2.4.1 Patient safety and its relation to quality 
Patient safety can be viewed as an aspect of quality, or it can be viewed as something 
resulting from work to improve quality. It could also be regarded as a prerequisite for quality 
(Kunnskapssenteret, 2010).  The relationship between quality and patient safety is not well 
defined or explored, and there is thus a vast array of definitions. Many describe this 
relationship as different endpoints in a continuum. According to Brown et al., (2008), the 
extent that an event will be viewed as a quality or safety issue will depend on the strength of 
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causation between event and the result, and the immediacy of the resulting harm. Vincent 
(2010) argues, based on Brown et al’s article, that events that clearly cause harm and have a 
clear relationship to specific errors or events are more likely to be labelled as patient safety 
issues. According to Brown et al (2008), as a generic rule for distinguishing safety and 
quality, very rare errors with high immediacy and high causality generally has been concerned 
with safety, while more frequent events with corresponding low immediacy and low causality 
has been concerned with quality. However, the authors do not follow this distinction, as there 
is no clear point as for when quality issues turns into safety issues. Further, they do not 
believe that safety can be distinguished from quality merely based on the causal link between 
error and outcome.   
The term “risk management” is established in industrial safety research. In patient safety, this 
term attempts to establish a relationship between the understanding of individual’s errors and 
harms that could cause damage to the patient and a wider focus that includes employees, 
visitors, and the society as a whole. In this sense, the term enables patient safety to be a part 
of the wider healthcare system and its safety (Kunnskapssenteret, 2010). Patient safety is thus 
not primarily regarded to be the result of individuals’ actions, but is a result from multiple 
actors, interactions with different layers in the provision of care, and of the institutional and 
organizational context of which patient care is provided   
According to Vincent (2010, p.31), patient safety can be defined as  
“the avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries 
stemming from the process of health care”  
This definition only addresses adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from the process of 
health care, and is thus separated from the wider quality perspective, which includes process 
and structure, as well as near-misses, errors and adverse events (Vincent, 2010). It is now 
argued that patient safety is also dependent on safe structures of which care is produced and 
delivered. However, whether patient safety is best assessed using structural, process or 
outcome measures is not agreed upon (ibid.). If structure and process measures are to be 
credible measures of patient safety, the link between these measures and the outcomes has to 
be established (Brook, McGlynn and Cleary, 1996, Pronovost, Miller and Wachter, 2006). A 
review prepared by Hearld, Alexander, Fraser and Jiang (2008) further demonstrated that the 
link between structure and outcome variables is not well established, as more than 45 % of the 
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studies included in their review had non-significant results between the organizational 
characteristics and the outcome variables. Of the remaining studies, a mix between positive 
and negative effects on quality was found (35 % positive and 24 % negative impact on 
quality). The authors of this review state that there is a need for theories and more research to 
incorporate all the three components structure, process and outcomes, for example by 
identifying situations where process variables moderate the relationship between structure and 
outcome. They found that most studies were focusing on linking structure and outcome, but 
the results were in many cases non-significant. However, the studies assessing the relationship 
between structure and process variables, and process and outcome variables, had more robust 
and consistent positive significant findings (Ibid.).  
The use of outcome measures as a reflection of quality and safety is contested (Salzer, Nixon, 
Schut, Karver and Bickman, (1997).  Patient outcomes may be determined by a combination 
of the patient`s underlying condition and the care the patient actually receives. Some outcome 
indicators are only a vague reflection of the safety and quality of care provided, such as 
wound infections (Vincent, 2010). Not all bad outcomes can be prevented, and some are side 
effects from treatment. As Lilford, Mohammed, Braunholtz and Hofer (2003) points to, if the 
factors that affect outcomes, but cannot be controlled by the organisation or the individual 
health care workers, vary systematically between units, organisations or professionals, the 
comparisons of the entities might be biased.  
A problem with using adverse events and errors as the main end point for measuring patient 
safety, as in the definition cited from Vincent (2010), is that a number of harms can occur 
during the course of health care. Malfunctioning medical equipment, postoperative infections, 
complications of surgery, harms from overcrowded hospitals – they are all important harms to 
the patient, but are not errors stemming from the process of health care. Thus, when applying 
a narrow definition only focusing on errors, these events are not included. They may even be 
the most important ones for the patient. The difficulties of linking errors to patient harm may 
be a reflection of the more general issue of how to link process and structure measures to 
outcomes as described above, and is thus not limited to patient safety (Vincent, 2010). The 
important question will be how one can identify the extent to which differences in outcomes 
are a reflection of differences in the quality of care delivered to patients, and how outcomes 
correlates to quality at the organisational level (Lilford et al., 2003).  
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What constitute good patient safety climate? 
Some key features of a good safety culture/ climate includes a blame-free environment, where 
individuals are encouraged to report both errors and near misses without fear of blame or 
punishment. Further, it entails promotion of collaboration between the different disciplines in 
the clinical area, allocation of resources for patient safety initiatives, as well as an 
understanding that the organization is operating in a high-risk area (Ross, 2011). Positive 
patient safety climate is characterised by high levels of communication, mutual trust, and a 
shared perception of the importance of safety, as well as trust in the institution’s efforts in the 
continuous improvement and commitment to safety (Nordic Council of Ministers, (2010). 
Finally, confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures is important (Halligan and Secevic 
2011).  
 
2.5 Can safety climate predict patient safety 
outcomes?  
Research undertaken in other high risk industries (for example aviation and nuclear industry) 
has shown that safe performance is dependent upon staff attention to reducing risk for error. 
Thus, in order to improve patient safety, it is important to assess staff attitudes and 
perceptions on safety. According to the UK`s National Patient Safety Agency (2004), there is 
evidence that when staff are encouraged to report adverse events and near-events, and 
analysis of causes and learning is encouraged, it can have a positive and measurable effect on 
the organization’s performance. In their seven-step program for patient safety, the promotion 
of a safety culture that is open and fair, and attempts to ensuring lessons are learned as well as 
for sharing information, is the first step towards creating safe health care (ibid.) 
In Deilkås’ PhD dissertation, a number of studies that demonstrate the effect of safety climate 
on a number of patient outcomes are referred to, such as urinary tract infections, medication 
errors, fewer blood stream infections, lower ventilator associated pneumonias and shorther 
ICU lengths of stay (Deilkås, 2010). Although the evidence linking patient safety culture and 
safety outcomes are still limited, these studies might demonstrate reasons to assume that 
safety culture could be an important aspect in both patient safety research and health care 
quality research. According to Gershon et al (2004), it is important to measure safety climate, 
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because there is increasing evidence that aspects of safety climate and culture are associated 
with a number of worker and quality of care outcomes. However, this suggestive evidence has 
failed to be present in meta-analytic studies – the association seems to be present merely in 
single studies which indicates that many studies have not found any effects or even negative 
effects (Hoff, Jameson, Hannan, & Flink, 2004).  Others conclude that there is limited data of 
support to improving patient safety outcomes (Pronovost, Holzmueller, Ennen and Fox, 
(2011).  Moreover, as Singer, Lin, Falwell, Gaba and Baker (2009) points to, while most  
researchers presume that the presence of a strong safety culture will lead to fewer errors and 
better safety outcomes, there is little available evidence supporting this link (Singer et al., 
2009; Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010). Little empirical research has aimed at testing this 
causal relationship in detail (Health Foundation (2011a), and most of the studies undertaken 
use perceptual or self-reported measures of clinical quality, instead of objective derived 
measures, which could impose uncertainties on the results (Singer et al 2009).   
Many studies attempting to establish an association between safety climate and patient 
outcomes use a cross-sectional design (Hearld et al 2008). Hence, it is not possible to 
determine an eventual causal relationship between climate and outcomes, nor the direction of 
such an eventual causal relationship. It is possible that there may be a circular relationship, 
where changes in safety behaviours and outcomes also improves safety climate (Health 
Foundation 2011a). For example, in a study by Pettker et al., (2009), 10 obstetrics-specific 
outcomes were prospectively tracked, while repeatedly measured safety attitudes using the 
SAQ questionnaire. They demonstrated a significant decrease in the adverse outcomes 
measured and an increase in the safety climate scores. However, they do not mention the 
hypothesized theoretical relationship between safety scores and outcomes. Further, they have 
not included a control group, and are hence not able to assess causality. Just to demonstrate 
that there is a co-variation does imply causality (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010). Finally, 
the level of aggregation is contested. Some studies aggregate safety climate scores to the 
organisational level or even aggregates different hospitals, due to the lack of patient outcome 
data on unit or hospital level (Flin, 2007). This could be problematic, as the safety climate 
could vary considerably between units (Deilkas & Hofoss, 2010). As Pronovost et al (2011) 
point to, culture have been shown to vary six times more within units in a hospital than 
between hospitals.  
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The construct validity of the concept of organizational safety culture/climate has been 
questioned. Cooper (2000) claims that safety culture probably is made up of many 
dimensions, which may not change simultaneously, as one dimension may change 
independently, leaving the others unaffected. It is not given that improvements in one aspect 
of care correlates to other aspects, and different dimensions of safety culture may correspond 
to different clinical practices, and hence have different end points. These are good arguments 
for measuring the dimensions of patient safety cultures independently rather than relying on a 
single, global measure.  
2.5.1 The level of aggregation 
The discussion of outcome measures directly relates to the discussion of levels of aggregation 
of safety climate survey data. As previously described, the safety climate can vary 
considerably more between units and wards in hospitals than between health care institutions. 
But, there is not always feasible to obtain valid data on safety outcomes on the unit level. In 
some cases, this can only be found at the organisational level. Thus, safety climate data have 
in some studies been aggregated to institutional level, and studied in relation to safety data at 
the same level. This could be inappropriate and lead to false conclusions. If one assumes - as 
many studies in fact do- (Hoff et al (2004), Hearld et al (2008), the Health Foundation 
(2011b), that there is a causal relationship from safety climate to safety outcomes, important 
differences in safety climate could be masked if the climate is aggregated to the hospital or 
institutional level, as much of the variation is found at unit/ ward level. One is hence not able 
to distinguish between the “problematic” units and those with a good safety climate. Further, 
one has no way to identify the units with the highest number of problematic events. This 
approach does not allow for direct comparisons of unit with low rates of problematic events, 
and units with high rates, to the safety climate. Conclusions based on inappropriate levels of 
aggregation should thus be interpreted with caution.  
 
2.6 Measuring safety culture/climate 
Historically, safety culture measurement has been most prominent within the organizational 
psychology research, and the methodology has in large part been developed within this 
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research tradition (Deilkås, 2010). The main focus has been industries and high reliability 
organizations. Surveys attempts to quantify and measure staff perceptions, which have been 
referred to as organizational climates. The use of safety attitude measurements in health care 
has as previously described, gained increased focus in health care settings recently. The first 
step to develop a safety culture is to assess and measure the organization’s present culture 
(National Patient Safety Agency 2004). There are a number of available instruments for 
measuring patient safety culture, and both qualitative and quantitative methods could (and 
should) be used. However, while many of these instruments share some of the dimensions, the 
terminology used to describe these dimensions vary greatly across instruments (Gershon et 
al., 2004). is in line with Schein’s definition of  safety climate as an observable artefact of the 
underlying, non-observable culture.  
2.6.1 The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (generic version) 
The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (generic version) (SAQ) derives from a questionnaire 
used in commercial aviation, the Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ). This 
questionnaire measures flight crew attitudes towards various interpersonal aspects of crew 
performance. These include items such as teamwork, the ability to speak up, leadership, 
communication, and joint decision-making.  About 25 % of the items in the FMAQ 
questionnaire demonstrated utility in the medical setting. It was therefore further developed 
into the Intensive Care Management Attitudes Questionnaire (Sexton et.al., 2006). A further 
refinement of this questionnaire, based on discussions with experts and health care providers, 
and two conceptual models (Vincent`s framework for risk and safety analysis, and the 
Donabedian conceptual model for quality assessment) (Deilkås, 2010), led to the 
identification of more than 100 items, covered by four themes (safety climate, teamwork 
climate, stress recognition and organisational climate). From this, the analytically derived 
structure of six factors, containing a total of 40 items, was developed. Three of the themes 
were identified as factors in the analysis, while the fourth (organisational climate) was further 
divided into three new factors; perceptions of management, working conditions and job 
satisfaction. An additional 20 items were included in the questionnaire, as they were 
perceived interesting and useful to the health care providers to whom the results of the pilot 
study were reported. The resulting questionnaire have been further refined into specific 
questionnaires for operating rooms, intensive care units, general inpatient wards, and 
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ambulatory clinics. The wording has been slightly changed to match the specific clinical 
setting, but the items are the same (Sexton et al., 2006).  
According to Deilkås (2010), the SAQ is the most widely used instrument for the 
measurement of patient safety culture. It has been translated into seven languages, and has 
been administered in over 2000 hospitals in eleven countries. Further, it is a well-documented 
instrument for measuring patient safety culture, as it has been published benchmarking scores 
for 203 clinical areas in tree countries, and the overall response rate of these is 67%. Finally, 
SAQ may be the only questionnaire with results that link patient safety culture scores to 
patient safety outcomes (ibid.).  
Validation of SAQ in Norway 
The SAQ have been validated for use in a number of countries, and have been translated to 
many languages. In Norway this was done in relation to the PHD dissertation by Ellen Tveter 
Deilkås (Deilkas & Hofoss, 2008). It was validated using a back-translation method, where it 
was first translated to Norwegian and then translated back to English by a second, blinded 
researcher. It was then compared to the original English version, and any the re-translation 
were discussed with one of the authors of the American questionnaire (ibid.) 
The SAQ was chosen for validation because the authors found this instrument to be the best-
validated instrument, both with regards to internal and external validity. Internationally, the 
construct validity have been documented with published data from more than 200 sites in the 
UK, US and New Zealand, in different clinical areas, ICUs, ORs and ambulatory clinics 
(Sexton et al., 2006). With regards to the external validity, this have been studied via 
investigations of the relationship between safety culture scores and patient outcomes (Deilkas 
& Hofoss, 2008).  
Deilkås and Hofoss demonstrated that the SAQ is a reliable and valid instrument for assessing 
patient safety cultures at wards and units also in the Norwegian health care setting. The 
confirmatory factor analysis undertaken in Norway gave a somewhat different factor structure 
than other assessments, with perceptions of management divided in two factors – perceptions 
of unit management and perceptions of hospital management (Deilkas & Hofoss, 2008). The 
SAQ (short form 2006, Norwegian version) consists of 36 questions, which relates to seven 
dimensions of patient safety (safety climate, teamwork climate, stress recognition, working 
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conditions, perceptions of hospital management, perception of unit management, and job 
satisfaction).  
 
Table 1: Factor definitions and item description SAQ (generic version)  
Factor dimensions and descriptions Items and examples  
Teamwork climate  
Perceived quality of collaboration between personnel 
6 items 
Nurse input is well received in this unit 
In this unit, it is difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with 
patient care 
Safety climate  
Perceptions of a strong and proactive organisational commitment of 
safety 
6 items 
I would feel safe being treated here as a patient 
Medical errors are handled appropriately in this unit 
I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding patient 
safety in this unit 
Stress recognition  
Acknowledgement of how performance is influenced by stressors 
4 Items 
When my workload becomes excessive, my performance is impaired 
I am less effective at work when fatigued 
Working conditions  
Perceived quality of the ward work environment and the logistical 
support (staffing, equipment etc) 
4 items 
The level of staffing is sufficient to adequately treat the number of 
patients.  
This hospital does a good job of training new personnel 
Job satisfaction  
Positivity about the work experience 
5 items 
I like my job 
Working here is like being part of a large family 
Perceptions of hospital management  
Approvements of hospital management action 
4 items  
Hospital management supports my daily efforts 
Hospital management does not knowingly compromise the safety of 
patients 
Perceptions of unit management  
Approvements of unit management action 
4 items  
Unit management supports my daily efforts 
Unit management does not knowingly compromise the safety of 
patients 
(Deilkas & Hofoss, 2008; Sexton et al., 2006) 
 
2.6.2 The RN4CAST survey 
The RN4CAST survey is a large, multinational cross-sectional  survey conducted in 12 
countries (with 3 “satellite” countries, including Norway), in 486 hospitals, 2169 units and 
33700 nurses, in 2009  The survey gathered information on several levels of the health care 
service, including hospital profiles (such as number of beds and patient days), patient 
outcomes (in Norway from Norwegian Patient Register) and survey data from nurses. All 
participating countries have followed the same procedures for data collection, and used the 
same survey instruments (Aiken et al., 2012). The Norwegian survey aims at developing 
knowledge about the relationship between hospital staffing, management of nursing 
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resources, job satisfaction and patient safety in the Norwegian context (project plan Personnel 
and patient safety, Kunnskapssenteret, 2009). 
2.6.3 Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) 
Items from Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) are part of the questionnaire 
in RN4CAST. The HSOPSC was developed in the US, funded by the National Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), based on the recognition of the need for a 
measurement tool for assessing patient safety cultures in health care organizations. It was 
developed based on literature reviews, including safety culture surveys, and interviews with 
health care personnel. After the questionnaire was designed, it was pilot tested on hospital 
employees from 21 American hospitals. Statistical analysis of the data were performed in 
order to assess psychometric properties of the instrument (item statistics, reliability and 
validity of the scales, as well as exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis for examination 
of the factor structure) (Sorra and Nieva, (2004). HSOPSC has been found to have good 
psychometric properties, where statistical testing includes item analysis, exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis, as well as inter-correlation and reliability analysis. The 
instrument has been used in a number of different countries, all over the world (Chen and Li, 
2010).  
Validation of HSOPSC in Norway  
The HSOPSC instrument was translated and tested with regards to validity and reliability in 
Norwegian health care by Olsen (2008). The author chose this instrument because, at the time 
of the study, it was demonstrated to have met more psychometric criteria compared to other 
instruments, and because benchmarking data were available from the Internet. The instrument 
was translated to Norwegian and then back to English again by two independent researchers, 
and the instrument was pilot tested in a small group of health care workers. The study 
included 1919 workers from a Norwegian hospital, with a response rate of 55%. The author 
found that the factorial structure of the instrument was reproduced in this Norwegian hospital, 
with ten safety culture dimensions and four outcome-measure dimensions. The results 
generally met the reliability and validity criteria as have been demonstrated internationally 
(ibid.) 
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Respondents are asked of their overall perception of safety, the frequency and number of 
event reporting and the overall grade of patient safety (Nieva & Sorra, 2003). The items are 
rated on a 5-item Likert-type scale. The first seven dimensions measure unit-level aspects of 
safety culture, the three following factors measures hospital-level aspects of safety culture, 
and finally, four outcome variables are included (AHRQ webpage, accessed 05.04.2012) 
 
Table 2: Factor dimensions and item descriptions of HSOPSC  
Factor dimensions and descriptions Items and examples 
Unit-level aspects of safety culture Supervisor/Manager  
Expectations & Actions Promoting Safety  
Supervisors/managers consider staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety, praise staff for following patient safety procedures, 
and do not overlook patient safety problems 
 
 
4 items 
My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job 
done according to established patient safety procedures.  
My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety. 
Organizational Learning—Continuous Improvement  
Mistakes have led to positive changes and changes are evaluated for 
effectiveness 
 
3 items 
We are actively doing things to improve patient safety.  
Mistakes have led to positive changes here 
Teamwork Within Units  
Staff support each other, treat each other with respect, and work 
together as a team 
 
4 items 
People support one another in this unit.  
When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a 
team to get the work done. 
Communication Openness  
Staff freely speak up if they see something that may negatively 
affect a patient and feel free to question those with more authority 
 
3 items 
Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively 
affect patient care. Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions 
of those with more authority. 
Feedback and Communication About Error  
Staff are informed about errors that happen, given feedback about 
changes implemented, and discuss ways to prevent errors 
 
3 items 
We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event 
reports. We are informed about errors that happen in this unit. 
Nonpunitive Response to Error  
Staff feel that their mistakes and event reports are not held against 
them and that mistakes are not kept in their personnel file 
 
3 items 
Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them. (negatively 
worded)  
When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written 
up, not the problem. 
(negatively worded) 
Staffing 
There are enough staff to handle the workload and work hours are 
appropriate to provide the best care for patients 
 
3 items 
We have enough staff to handle the workload. 
Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care. 
(negatively worded) 
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Table 2 Continued 
Hospital-level aspects of safety 
 
Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety  
Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient 
safety and shows that patient safety is a top priority 
 
 
 
3 items 
Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient 
safety.  
The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top 
priority 
Teamwork Across Hospital Units  
Hospital units cooperate and coordinate with one another to provide 
the best care for patients 
 
4 items 
There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work 
together.  
Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for 
patients. 
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions  
Important patient care information is transferred across hospital 
units and during shift changes 
4 items 
Things "fall between the cracks" when transferring patients from one 
unit to another. (negatively worded) 
Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) 
Outcome variables 
Overall Perceptions of Safety  
Procedures and systems are good at preventing errors and there is a 
lack of patient safety problems 
 
 
4 items 
Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done.  
Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening. 
Frequency of Event Reporting  
Mistakes of the following types are reported: (1) mistakes caught 
and corrected before affecting the patient, (2) mistakes with no 
potential to harm the patient, and (3) mistakes that could harm the 
patient 
 
3 items 
When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting 
the patient, how often is this reported? When a mistake is made, but 
has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this reported? 
Patient Safety Grade (of the Hospital Unit)  
 
1 item 
Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on 
patient safety. 
Number of Events Reported 1 item 
In the past 12 months, how many event reports have you filled out 
and submitted? 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004;  AHRQ http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/patientsafetyculture) 
 
2.7 Safety Attitudes Questionnaire and Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety Culture compared 
The Norwegian version of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ), Generic version (Short 
Form 2006) consist of seven dimensions, as can be seen from table 1. The dimensions relates 
to aspects of safety climate, teamwork climate, stress recognition, working conditions, job 
satisfaction, and perceptions of unit and hospital management. The HSOPSC instrument 
contains of a total of ten dimensions relating to patient safety aspects (se table 2). Seven of 
these dimensions regard the unit-level and the remaining three regards the hospital-wide level 
One important difference between SAQ and HSOPSC is that the HSOPSC also includes 
outcome measures. Two single-item and two and multiple-item scales containing self-
reported measures of the number of events reported, overall patient safety grade, overall 
perceptions of safety and the frequency of events reported are included.  
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Conversion of dimension scores of the two instruments 
A study published in April 2012 investigated whether scores on dimensions from the 
HSOPSC instrument could be converted to scores to the corresponding dimension in a second 
instrument, the SAQ (Etchegaray & Thomas, 2012). They focused on the dimensions 
teamwork and safety climate, and found that while they were able to convert scores from 
HSOPSC into scores for the safety climate and teamwork dimensions of the SAQ instrument; 
the per cent of variance explained was moderate. Further, they stated that it is not self-evident 
that the scales match each other, as the items included in the dimensions in the two 
instruments are not the same. They concluded that the surveys probably cannot be converted 
(ibid.).  
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3 Design 
According to Kumar (2005), research is the process of collecting, analysing and interpreting 
information, in order to answer questions. This process has certain requirements; it must be 
controlled, rigorous, systematic, valid, empirical and critical. These requirements are the same 
whether the research undertaken is qualitative or quantitative. What distinguish qualitative 
and quantitative research are the methods for data collection, procedures for analysing the 
data, and how the findings are communicated. Where quantitative research emphasizes 
measurement and classification of variables, aiming at drawing inferences about associations, 
qualitative research aims at describing variation in the research topic using fewer cases but in-
depth assessments of these (Kumar, 2005).  
A questionnaire can both be quantitative and qualitative, depending on the purpose of the 
research and the design of the questionnaire. Quantitative methods are useful when one wants 
to compare groups or units, and the sample size is large. If the aim is to assess opinions and 
attitudes, or testing an eventual relationship between variables, one can use a structured, 
close-ended questionnaire. The data collected can thus be suitable for quantitative statistical 
analyses.  
 
3.1 Ethical approval, consent and confidentiality  
This survey does not include patients or patient related information, and are thus not subject 
for restrictions following the Norwegian law on medical and health research, § 2 
(Helseforskningsloven).   
However, any collection, recording or storing of personal data with use of a computer requires 
the research project to notify the Data Protection Official for Research (Lov om behandling av 
personopplysninger). The use of personal data in this project implies that the project was 
required to submit a notification form to the Data Protection Official for Research . As this 
survey is part of a larger project, the approval for this survey has been given in relation to this 
larger project (Appendix I).  
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The cover letter in the questionnaire clearly stated that participation was voluntarily, and that 
the responses would be treated with confidentiality by all researchers. When the respondents 
submitter their questionnaire, it was regarded as consent to participate in the survey. The Data 
Protection Official for Research stated that the list connecting names and questionnaires-IDs 
had to be deleted when data collection was ended. The researchers have signed a 
confidentiality agreement, and all data were stored and analysed in the Norwegian Knowledge 
Centre for Health Services` secure database. 
 
3.2 The survey 
This study is designed as a quantitative survey with a cross-sectional design. A survey 
collects information from the study population through their responses to standardized 
questions (Chambliss and Schutt 2010). As the researcher is not present to clarify and answer 
questions, it is essential that the questions are clear and easy to understand. To increase the 
response rate, the distribution form of the questionnaire is important. A collective distribution, 
such as distribution in the work place, is a way that usually gives highest response rate, 
compared to distribution via mail or in a public place (Kumar, 2005). 
As the aim of this survey was to investigate if the questions from RN4CAST can be used as 
measures of patient safety attitudes, it was considered a great advantage to have respondents 
answering both questionnaires at once. Thus, it is possible to estimate measures of correlation 
and agreement between the two instruments.  The aim is to investigate whether there is an 
association between questions in the two instruments. The survey is thus correlational. The 
study is also descriptive – it can be used to describe how the respondents perceive the patient 
safety culture at their ward at the time they responded to the survey. Both instruments consist 
of closed-ended questions, and they include both positive and negative worded items. Space 
for comments on patient safety issues at the work place/clinical area was included. 
3.2.1 The questionnaire     
The questionnaire had already been designed when I entered the project. It is a combination of 
the Norwegian version of Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ (2006 short form, general 
version), and questions regarding patient safety attitudes from the RN4CAST survey. These 
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questions are from the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC). There is also 
included some demographic questions relating to gender, work experience and occupational 
group.  
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) 
The first 41 items in the questionnaire consists of the entire Safety Attitudes Questionnaire 
(2006 short form, Norwegian version). All questions are closed-ended with response along a 
six—point Likert-type scale (strongly disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, 
strongly agree, don’t know).  The sixth response option is not included in Sexton et al’s article 
from 2006. The instrument has been further described in chapter 2.6  
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) 
The items from RN4CAST on patient safety culture are items from the Hospital Survey on 
Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC). The questions are seven items from the five dimensions 
communication openness, feedback and communication about error, nonpunitive response to 
error, hospital management support for patient safety, and hospital handoffs and transitions. 
All questions are closed-ended with response along a five—point Likert-type scale (strongly 
disagree, disagree, neither, agree, strongly agree). See chapter 2.6 for a more thorough 
description of the instrument.  
The composite scales  
As will be further described, two composite safety climate scales are created from the 
RN4CAST items relating to patient safety. They differ somewhat in the items included. Table 
3 gives an overview of the items included in the two scales, and which HSOPSC dimension 
the items belong to.  
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Table 3 Items included in the RN safety composite scales, and the SAQ safety climate  
 Composite scale RN 
safety_II 
Composite scale RN 
safety_I 
            SAQ safety climate items 
Feedback and 
communication about 
error 
We are given feedback 
about changes put into place 
based on event reports 
 
 
In this unit, we discuss ways 
to prevent errors from 
happening again 
We are given feedback 
about changes put into 
place based on event 
reports 
 
In this unit, we discuss 
ways to prevent errors 
from happening again 
 I would feel safe being treated here as a 
patient 
 
Medical errors are handled appropriately in 
this unit 
 
I know the proper channels to direct 
questions regarding patient safety in this 
unit 
 
I receive appropriate feedback about my 
performance 
  
In this unit, it is difficult to discuss errors 
 
 I am encouraged by my colleagues to report 
any patient safety concerns I may have 
 
The culture in this unit makes it easy to 
learn from the errors of others 
Communication openness  Staff feel free to question 
the decisions or actions 
of those with more 
authority 
Nonpunitive response to 
error 
Staff feel like their mistakes 
are held against them 
Staff feel like their 
mistakes are held against 
them 
Handoffs and Transitions Things “fall between the 
cracks” when transferring 
patients from one unit to 
another 
 
Important patient care 
information is often lost 
during shift changes 
 
 
 
 
The items from the RN4CAST survey are patient safety items relating to perceptions of how 
errors are treated, how feedback is given and how patient safety concerns are treated. The 
different dimensions in SAQ have been assessed, and the items from RN4CAST have been 
found to be most similar to the items in the SAQ safety climate dimension. The items 
included in the RN safety composite scale are hence assumed to relate to the same underlying 
constructs as the SAQ safety climate dimension.  
 
3.3 Data collection  
Initially, this questionnaire was supposed to be distributed to nine Norwegian hospitals in a 
number of wards. However, the national Patient Safety Campaign were planning on 
distributing the same SAQ questionnaire the autumn of 2011, and most of the hospitals were 
reluctant to make their employees respond to questionnaires with similar themes twice in a 
short time. Thus, eventually we were left with only one hospital, and two wards. The wards 
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chose to participate because they were already involved in a research project at the Norwegian 
Knowledge Centre for the Health Care Services.  
The questionnaires were distributed to health care personnel at two wards in one Norwegian 
hospital during the summer of 2011. Before distribution, a list of names and addresses of the 
employees had been collected, and this was used to label the questionnaires with a personal 
id-number. A questionnaire was then placed in a named envelope together with a pre-paid, 
addressed return envelope, which the respondents were supposed to return to the Knowledge 
Centre via mail. A researcher from the Knowledge Centre and the author of this thesis 
travelled to the hospital to distribute the questionnaires. Here we met with the hospital’s 
infection control nurse as well as one nurse from each of the two participating wards. This 
contact aimed at both summing up the data collection of the previous project, as well as to 
increase the support for this one. It was seen as a great advantage to be able to build upon an 
established relationship with a motivated and interested employee, as this could increase the 
support for this questionnaire and eventually the final response rate.  
When the questionnaires were returned, the names would be crosschecked and removed from 
the list, so that there would be no way to trace the answers back to the individuals. After 6 
weeks, a reminder was sent out to the non-respondents, together with a new questionnaire.. 
When the questionnaires arrived at the Knowledge Centre the data were entered into PAWS 
statistics (IBM SPSS 18.0 (Statistical Package for Social Sciences)). The Data Protection 
Official for Research approved the method of data collection and handling. 
 
3.4 Sample 
The first participating ward is a surgical ward, with a total of 21 beds and 23 nurses, as well 
as 13 nurse aid staff and 14 orthopedists. The second ward is an intensive care unit with a 
total of 71 nurses, as well as 4 nursing aid personnel and 18 anesthesiologists. As only nurses 
were asked to respond to the RN4CAST survey, only the responses from nurses in these two 
wards are included in the analysis. This gives a sample of 94 nurses. 27 of the nurses did not 
complete the survey, giving a number of respondents of 67 and a response rate of 71%. As the 
aim was not to investigate the patient safety climate at the different wards, the two wards are 
treated as one sample, and all statistical analyses are performed using this one sample 
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approach. The demographic composition of the sample will be presented more closely in 
chapter five.  
 
3.5 Response rate  
A common problem with surveys is a low response rate. There are a number of steps available 
to increase the response rate, but ultimately it can depend on how interesting the survey 
appears for the respondents, the length of the questionnaire and the methodology used to 
distribute the questionnaire. Chambliss and Schutt (2010) claims one should be content with a 
response rate of 50 %  
Since only two units participated in this survey, it was important to ensure a high response 
rate. One way of achieving this, while at the same time ensuring high quality of the data 
collected, is by ensuring that the purpose and relevance of the survey is explained to the 
potential respondents (Kumar, 2005). Hence, the cover letter of the survey is could play an 
important role in ensuring high response rate and high data quality. The cover letter should be 
interesting to read and it must explain issues such as voluntary participation and 
confidentiality (Chambliss and Schutt (2010).  
 
3.6 Common method variance 
Common method variance is defined as the variance attributable to the method of 
measurement rather than the construct the measures represent (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff (2003). Method biases are said to be one of the main sources of measurement error 
– and can hence threaten the conclusions about underlying relationships between variables 
measured. They can have both a random and a systematic component. The latter is the most 
threatening to the validity of the conclusions, because it provides an alternative reason for the 
observed relationships between measures of different constructs than the one hypothesized by 
the researchers (ibid.). In this survey, there is a hypothesized correlational relationship 
between one construct, namely safety climate, measured by two different instruments. If the 
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measures of the two constructs share the same method of measurement, these methods may 
exert a systematic effect of the observed correlation between the measures.  
The systematic effect may increase if the same respondents rate the different constructs. This 
could be due to a cognitive need for appearing coherent (Podsakoff et al., 2003) – that is, if 
one has responded in a certain way to the predictor variable, one can automatically and 
unknowingly respond in a way that supports this response in the criterion variable. If one 
gives an overall positive response to a question of grading the safety at ones hospital, one 
might respond to items regarding aspects of safety in a more positive manner. Further, any 
observed relationship between predictive and outcome variable could be distorted by how the 
respondents perceive the relationship between these items in the questionnaire, and their 
implicit assumptions about this relationship. If they implicitly assume that there should be a 
relationship between how they rate the patient safety state, and how the work environment 
should support the patient safety state, it could affect the way they respond. Finally, just the 
fact that predictor and criterion variables are measured at the same point of time could be a 
source of mono-method bias.  
In a review by Meade, Watson and Kroustalis (2007), attempts were made to identify the 
magnitude of common method bias in organisational research. They found that even if the 
presence of common method variance in organisational research is pervasive, the magnitude 
of the common method bias is rather small in many cases. They claim that use of negative 
worded items; randomized item order and multiple methods and raters where this is feasible 
would in many cases be enough to counteract common method bias. Further, common 
methods may not even result in problematic common method bias – and is not necessarily 
representing a threat to the validity of study conclusions in every case (ibid.). 
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4 Analytical approach 
The questionnaires were entered into PAWS statistics (SPSS) as soon as they arrived the 
Knowledge Centre. A reminder was sent to the ones not responding, together with a new copy 
of the questionnaire and a pre-paid, addressed envelope, 6 weeks after the initial distribution. 
This was the only reminder sent – and if the questionnaire still was not returned, the 
individuals were labeled as non-respondents. From the Data Protection Office for Research, 
only one reminder was permitted.  The period of data collection was extended by a few 
weaks, as the initial distribution of questionnaires took place during the summer period. In 
order to reach those on summer holidays, it was quite a long time period before the reminder 
was sent out.  
The responses were recoded from a scale from 1-5 (6) to 0-100. This is in accordance with 
recommendations from Sexton et al’s article (2006). The 6th response option in the SAQ, 
“don’t know” (DK), was coded as missing. There is no unambiguous way to treat DK 
responses, but a the survey methodology resources consulted recommended coding as 
missing, and it is thus the approach I have followed. This could pose difficulties in the 
analysis, as some of the items in the survey have a quite substantial number of don’t know- 
responses. The items with negative wording were then reversed, and the mean of each item 
were calculated. The items were then collapsed into scales (factors). The mean score and the 
percentage positive response for each factor, along with reference values from the literature, 
will be presented in the results section of this thesis. The percentage of respondents giving 
positive scores (> slightly agree) will also be presented. According to Sexton et al (2006), this 
is a measure of the strength of the safety climate. This is important, because, as Zohar et al 
points to in their article, the strength indicates the level of consensus among the individuals in 
the unit regarding the importance of patient safety (Zohar et al., 2007). The number of 
missing items was assessed before any statistical analyses were performed, and will be 
presented in the results section.  
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4.1 Validation of questionnaires 
According to Prous et al (2009) a valid questionnaire is required to be feasible, reliable and 
precise, have content validity (be adequate for the problem it is intended to measure) and 
construct validity (adequate for the underlying concept or phenomenon), and be sensitive to 
change. To investigate an instrument’s psychometric properties is a process that involves 
assessment of all these different requirements.   
4.1.1 Likert-type items and level of measurement 
There is extensive debate as to whether data derived from Likert-type scales can be treated as 
interval level data. A Likert-type scale produces data on the ordinal level, and in order to 
perform parametric tests, to present results using means, standard deviation etc, data on the 
continuous level is required. Thus, in theory one cannot treat data from a Likert-type scale as 
continuous data. This debate is somewhat theoretical, however. In practice, parametric 
statistics based on the normal distribution is often applied. Some claim that the parametric 
statistics are robust enough to use, even if the underlying assumptions are not met. Further, 
according to Ringdal (2007), one can apply parametric statistics on ordinal level data, given 
that the data are assumed to measure some latent continuous variable, if it is reasonable to 
assume that the variable is continuous in the population, and have at least five categories. In 
this case, the data have been transformed from responses along a scale from 1-6, into 0-100, 
and the analysis is performed on factors that are averages of many items. Thus, the 
assumptions behind parametric statistics are found to be met, and the statistics performed in 
the analysis will be based on the normal distribution   
4.1.2 Reliability 
An instrument’s reliability is the degree to which the instrument accurately measures 
something without error. Reliability measures the proportion of the total variance a variable 
adopts that is owed to true differences between the respondents. A reliable instrument is thus 
a precise instrument, given that the measurements are free of error. Eventual measurement 
errors could be caused by either a systematic error (bias) or a random error (Prous, de 
Yèbenes, Salvanès and Ortels, 2009). The effect of systematic errors could result in erroneous 
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conclusions about correlations of variables in the instrument, and it is hence critical to reduce 
the chances of such errors to occur.    
Interitem reliability  
To assess the internal consistency, or the inter-item reliability, of the instrument used in this 
survey, the Chronbach’s alpha will be estimated for each factor. Cronbach’s Alpha is one of 
the most frequent statistics applied to assess internal consistency (Pallant, 2007). It is a group-
level summary statistic or coefficient, that describes the degree to which measurements from a 
specific sample of respondents are replicated or consistent across a set of items or objects. It 
is used on continuous item-response formats (for example 1-5) (Helms, Henze, Sass, & 
Mifsud, 2006). It is important to note that even if Chronbach’s alpha is an indicator of the 
degree to which respondents’ answers to scale items in an instrument co-vary, it is not 
necessarily a measure of homogeneity (unidimensionality) of the responses. Thus, it should 
not be used to indicate the extent to which a single factor has been measured. The internal 
consistency depends on the number of items that makes up the factor and the mean correlation 
between these items. Thus, a conceptual framework for explaining the associations between 
items is required in order to avoid high alpha scale scores on scales with little conceptual 
meaning (Ibid.) 
Interrater reliability  
The intraclass correlation is a measure of agreement within raters for the same subject. The 
ICC is the proportion of total variability accounted for by the variability among subjects. A 
high ICC means that not much of the variability is due to variability inmeasurement on the 
two instruments; that the agreement between them is high (Prieto, Lamarca, Casado and 
Alonso, 1997) 
An estimate of interrater reliability can give information on the proportion of ratings that 
represents an underlying construct. There are six different ICCs, with different interpretation.  
Pearson’s and Spearman`s correlation coefficient 
To further assess the relationship between the variables, the Pearson`s correlation coefficient 
will be calculated. This is a measure of strength of relationship between variables, and can 
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vary from -1 to 1. The former indicates a perfect negative correlation, the latter a perfect 
positive correlation. Values around 0 indicate no relation between the variables. It is 
important to note that to just “look around” in the data for correlations is usually a bad idea. 
Assessments of correlation should always be performed on basis of theoretical knowledge and 
hypotheses that are theory-derived.  
As the Pearson`s correlation coefficient is a parametric measure, the non-parametric 
alternative (Spearman`s rho) will also be calculated. As previously described, scales that are 
assumed to reflect an underlying construct, containing items with more than five response 
categories can be treated as continuous and hence it is appropriate to perform parametric 
statistics. If the Pearson`s and the Spearman`s correlation coefficient provide similar estimates 
of the strength of the relationship between the two variables, parametric statistics will be used 
in the following analyses.  
 
Table 4 Strength of linear relationship 
Correlation Coefficient value    Strength of linear relationship 
 
At least 0.8   Very strong 
0.6 up to 0.8   Moderately strong 
0.3 to 0.5 Fair 
Less than 0.3  Poor 
Source: Chan (2003) 
 
4.1.3 Validity 
An instrument’s validity refers to how well it measures what it is intended to. There are four 
main different ways to assess the validity of an instrument (Chambliss and Schutt 2010). It is 
important to note that these four types of validity are not the only ones existing, they are not 
universally agreed upon, and there exists multiple terminologies depending on the research 
tradition. For example, construct and criterion validity can sometimes be used 
interchangeably. Table 5 presents an overview of the four types of validity.  
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Table 5: Types of validity  
Types of validity                                                               Description 
Face validity (logic or apparent validity) Refers to the degree an instrument appears to measure, in the opinion of experts 
and respondents  
 
Content validity Establishes whether or not the entire range of the concept`s dimensions have been 
covered by the instrument. This relates to the composition of the instrument, and is 
usually based on the expert judgements from many sources (e.g. literature reviews, 
pilot studies and expert opinions). It can also be explored using factorial analysis 
 
Criterion validity Established if the results from a new instrument matches an already validated 
instrument. They can both be measured at the same time (concurrent validity) or 
predict scores on a different instrument in the future (predictive validity)  
 
Construct validity Refers to the degree an instrument correlates to the theorized underlying construct 
it is intended to measure – if it measures what it is intended to measure 
source: Prous et al 2009, Chambliss and Schutt 2010 
 
Both face and content validity of the SAQ and the HSOPSC have been established (Sexton 
et.al, 2006; Blegen, Gearhart, O`Brien, Seghal and Alldregde, 2009), also in Norway (Deilkas 
& Hofoss, 2008), (Olsen, 2008).  With regards to its construct validity, scores from SAQ have 
been associated with a number of different patient outcomes (Colla, Bracken, Kinney, & 
Weeks, 2005). Here, the concurrent validity of the RN4CAST patient safety attitudes 
questions will be assessed, in relation to the previously validated instrument, SAQ.  
4.1.4 Assessment of agreement  
The correlation coefficient measures linear relationships. However, it is possible that there 
exists a linear relationship between two variables, but there could still be large differences in 
the variables across their range of values. The Bland-Altman plot, or difference plot, is a 
graphic display of the agreement of the variables. It is a common method used to assess 
agreement between two methods that measures continuous variables measured on the same 
scale. The Bland-Altman plot displays the difference scores of the two variables -  the bias (x-
y), or the mean difference between the two measures, on the Y-axis, and the mean of the two 
variables (x+y(/2) on the X-axis. It can also include the zero bias-line and the 95% upper and 
lower agreement lines (0+1.96diff and 0-1.96diff). If there is no systematic bias, the 
differences will be symmetric around the zero bias line (Dewitte, Fierens, Stöckl, & 
Thienpont, 2002) 
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A Bland-Altman assessment of agreement was used to compare the agreement between the 
two instruments. For this purpose, MedCalc software was used. A range of agreement was 
defined as mean bias ± 1.96 SD (Bland and Altman, 1986) . The results from this assessment 
were compared to the results from the correlation analysis, and will be presented in the results 
chapter.  
 
4.2 Exploratory factor analysis 
Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical procedure most frequently used in psychology and 
education (Williams, Ownsman and Brown, 2010). It can be used to reduce a large number of 
variables into smaller numbers of coherent subscales (Pallant 2007) – which are often referred 
to as factors. Further, as it can contribute to establishing underlying dimensions between 
measured variables and latent constructs, it can contribute to formation and refining of 
theories. Finally, it can contribute to evidence assessment of the construct validity of self-
reporting scales (Williams et al., 2010). There are two main approaches to factor analysis – 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. The approach used in this thesis is a principal 
component analysis, which is a form of exploratory factor analysis. The reason for the choice 
of method relates to the different useability in the different stages of the research process of 
the two appraoches. Exploratory factor analysis is most often applied in early stages of the 
research process, to gather information about the interrelationships of given set of variables. 
Confirmatory factor analysis is most dominantly used to test specific hypotheses and theories 
regarding the underlying structure of the given variables (Pallant 2007). Further, there are a 
variety of different but related statistical techniques underlying the factor analysis umbrella. 
The most common ones are principal component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis (FA). 
These are in many ways similar, and the terms are often used interchangeably in research. 
Both are tools in the process of producing a smaller number of linear combinations of the 
original variables in a way that accounts for most of the variability in the pattern of 
correlations.  
The two approaches differ in the way they treat the variance in the variables. In PCA, the 
original variables are transformed to a smaller set of linear combinations. Here, all the 
variance in the variables is used. In FA, however, the factors are estimated via the use of 
 35 
 
mathematical models, where only the shared variance is analysed. These two methods will in 
many cases produce similar results, but there is nonetheless extensive debate as to which 
method is recommended (ibid.).  
4.2.1 Decisions in factor analysis 
Before conducting a factor analysis, the sample size and adequacy must be assessed, and a 
number of decisions needs to be made about the procedures and techniques applied in the 
analysis. In the following sections, the different decisions will be presented and discussed.  
Sample size and adequacy  
The sample size in factor analyses should be given thorough considerations. According to 
Williams et al. (2010), there exists several rule of thumbs regarding size in the literature, and 
there are very varying opinions. However, there seems to be agreement on that the larger 
sample, the better. Some proposes a sample size of 300 or more, while others claim that the 
ratio of subjects to items is of greater concern than the sample size itself. Here, the 
recommendations vary from 10 cases per item to be factored, to a ratio of 5:1 (Pallant 2007).  
Measures of sample adequacy give information on how strong the items in the analysis are 
correlated, and it does help the researcher assess whether there is an underlying relationship 
between the items, and thus the grouping of the items in the instrument into coherent 
subscales (Burton and Mazerolle 2011). An inspection of the correlation matrix for 
correlation coefficients of greater value than .03 is recommended in the literature. If few are 
found, it could imply that a factor analysis is not appropriate on the data (Pallant 2007). To 
assess sampling adequacy, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy needs to 
be examined. A KMO correlation above .60 is generally assumed to be adequate for analysing 
of the PCA output. Further, Bartlett’s test of sphericity should be significant if the factor 
analysis to be undertaken. If the test does not produce significant results, it is an indication of 
no relationship between the variables. 
Factor extraction – number and methods 
The method for extracting factors needs to be determined next. Factor extraction 
(identification) is the process of determining the smallest number of factors that best can 
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represent the interrelations in the given variables (Pallard, 2007). Other than drawing on a 
priori knowledge about the number of factors needed to explain the underlying latent 
constructs, there are a number of approaches available to guide this process. The most 
common is the previously mentioned Principal Component Analysis. The need for simplicity 
in the number of factors must be balanced with the need for explaining as much of the 
variance in the variables as possible. The first factor is the combination of items whose shared 
correlations explain the most of the variance, and the following factors are the ones that 
explain the greatest of the remaining total variance (Burton and Mazerolle, 2011).  There is 
no given rule for balancing these needs; the researcher needs to make judgements in this 
process. However, Pallard (2007) describes three techniques that can provide assistance when 
deciding on how many factors to keep from the analysis. The first is Kaiser’s criterion, or the 
eigenvalue rule. This specifies that only factors with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or more should be 
retained. The eigenvalue is the amount of the total variance explained by the factor. Second, 
Catell’s scree test, where one plots each of the eigenvalues of the factors, and inspects this 
plot for when the shape of the curve changes direction and becomes horizontal. It is then easy 
to see which factors contribute most to the explanation of the variance in the variables and 
thus should be retained – these are the ones above the elbow, or break, in the plot. The final 
technique is parallel analysis, where the factors’ eigenvalues are compared to randomly 
generated eigenvalues from data sets with similar size. Here, only those eigenvalues that 
exceeds the corresponding values from the random data set are retained. This has been shown 
to be the most accurate method for factor retention, as both the two previously described 
approaches have tendencies to overestimate the number of components (Pallard, 2007). 
However, this is the method with the least reported use in the literature, perhaps because it is 
not available in standard statistical programs such as PAWS or SAS (Williams et al., 2010).  
 
Factor rotation 
The next step in the analysis is the selection method for factor rotation. This is a tool for 
easing the interpretation of factor analysis, and involves presenting the patterns of loadings in 
a more easily interpretable way, as it shows how the different variables ‘clump together’ 
(Pallard, 2007). Rotation maximises the high item loadings and minimizes the low item 
loadings (Williams et al., 2010). There are two techniques to choose between, which results in 
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either orthogonal (uncorrelated) or oblique (correlated) factor solutions. The latter are more 
difficult to interpret, describe and report, and in practice they often result in similar solutions. 
Hence, many researchers apply both orthogonal and oblique rotations and report the one 
clearest and easiest to interpret (Pallard, 2007). A different approach is to assess the inter-
correlations among the factors. If this is low, one can use an orthogonal rotation method.  
Interpretation 
At least two or three items should load on a factor in order to give it a meaningful 
interpretation (Williams et al., 2010). Further, instrument items should only load to a single 
factor at .50 or higher, with no cross loadings (loading on more than one factor) on more than 
>.30 (Burton and Mazerolle 2011). The factor loadings should then be given a name or a 
theme that reflects an underlying theory or concept. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Sample descriptives  
5.1.1 Response rate 
As 67 nurses out of a total of 94 completed and returned the questionnaire, the final response 
rate was 71 %. This is a high response rate, and is in large part due to the efforts made by the 
hospital hygiene nurse and the nurse representatives from the two wards, as they clearly 
communicated the importance of completing the questionnaire to their colleagues. The 
response rate is somewhat higher than the ones Sexton et al (2006) presents in their article on 
benchmarking data for SAQ. Se table 6 for demographic description of the sample in this 
survey. I have chosen to aggregate these two wards to one sample. However, to treat them as 
one might pose challenges. As previously described, the level of aggregation might be of 
significance. As no attempt is made here to examine eventual relationships between safety 
climate and safety outcomes, the dangers of incorrectly aggregation of data have been 
considered to be small.  
Demographic description of sample 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the sample (n=94 non-respondents n=27) 
Demographic variable Frequency n, (%) 
Gender 
 Male   
   
 Female  
   
 Missing    
 
5,  (7.5%) 
60, (89.6%) 
2 (2.9%) 
Position 
                  Nurse 
  
 Nurse manager 
 
64, (95.5%) 
3, (4.5%) 
Years in speciality/ clinical area 
                   < 1 mnd   
 1 mth -2 years  
 3-4 years  
 > 4 years   
 
 
0, (0%) 
8, (12%) 
4, (6%) 
55, (82%) 
Non-respondents   27, (29.3%) 
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5.1.2 Missing values 
The number of non-responses is never higher than two per item. However, all the responses 
from the category “don’t know” were coded as missing. Thus, the number of missing values 
is for some items quite substantial. The percentage of missing (both DK responses and non-
response) varies from 1- 28.3% on single items, and for the dimension “perceptions of 
hospital management”, the percentage of missing items is as large as 34.4%, when missing 
responses for all items are cumulated. Missing items have been excluded pairwise, and have 
hence been assessed separately in each item.  
The items with the most missing values are the items from the dimensions “perceptions of 
hospital management”. Similarly, the other dimension with the highest number of missing 
values is the “perception of unit management” dimension. See table 7 for the number and 
percentage DK and non-response items, and total missing items.  
 
Table 7 Number and percent missing items 
Item Don`t Know (n, %) Non-response 
(n,%) 
Total  
missing (n, 
%) 
I get adequate, timely information about events that might affect my 
work from hospital Management 
17, 25.3% 2, 3% 19, 28.3 % 
Hospital management is doing a good job 16, 23.9% 2, 3% 18, 26.3 % 
Problem personnel are dealt with constructively by our hospital 
management 
13, 19.4% 2, 3% 15, 22.4 % 
Hospital management supports my daily efforts 9, 13.4% 2, 3% 11, 16.4 % 
Hospital management doesn't knowingly compromise patient safety 8, 11.9 % 2, 3% 10, 14.9 % 
Unit management doesn't knowingly compromise patient safety 6, 8.9 % 2,3% 8, 11.9 % 
Problem personnel are dealt with constructively by our unit 
management 
6, 8.9 %  2, 3% 8, 11.9 % 
 
 
As one can see from table 7, there is a quite substantial number of missing values for items in 
the SAQ factors “perception of hospital management” and for two of the items in the 
“perceptions of unit management”. This could be due to the proximity between front line 
workers and the management in the organization, and will be discussed in following chapters.  
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5.2 Results SAQ  
SAQ scores are presented as the percentage of positive responses for each dimension. 
Presented as reference values for this sample are results from Sexton et al (2006) and Deilkås 
and Hofoss (2008). The SAQ scores are not the main focus of this thesis, and are hence 
presented only briefly here. However, as one can see from figure 1, the results are quite 
similar. There is no value for the perception of hospital management from Sexton et al 2006. 
This is due to the different factor structure of SAQ in Norway, where the dimension 
“perception of management” have been divided into two dimensions. Table 8 provides more 
information on the mean, SD and Chronbach’s Alpha for each SAQ dimension, as well as for 
the two composite RN safety climate scales.  
 
Figure 1 Percentage positive response to each dimension 
 
 
Reliability of SAQ dimensions 
All dimensions from SAQ demonstrated satisfying internal consistency as measured by the 
Chronbach’s Alpha. It ranged from .721 to .865, with the highest Chronbach’s Alpha for 
safety climate (see table 8). This result is similar to reference values from the literature 
(Sexton et al 2006, Deilkås and Hofoss 2008). Hence, the dimensions seem to be applicable 
for my sample as well.   
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Table 8 Number of respondents and results for each factor 
 N   valid, missing 
               
Mean SD Percentage 
positive 
Chronbach`s 
Alpha 
Teamwork climate             61, 7 
             
75 16.2 76.1 .725 (n=6) 
Safety climate             58, 10 
 
71 19.4 69.6 .865 (n=7) 
Job satisfaction             64, 4 
             
79 19.5 82.9 .855 (n=5) 
Stress recognition             63, 5 
            
73 20.5 74.4 .748 (n=4) 
Perception of unit 
management 
           53, 15 
 
54 21.7 42.4 .832 (n=5) 
Perception of hospital 
management 
           44, 24 
            
47 18.1 26.4 .788 (n=5) 
Working conditions            62, 6 
           
58 18 55.5 .721 (n=4) 
Rnsafety_I            62, 6 
            
66 18 66.2 .815 (n=4) 
Rnsafety_II            61, 7 
            
65 16.5 68.4 .804 (n=5) 
 
 
5.3 Principal component analysis 
The principal component analysis (PCA) analysis was initially attempted with all the items 
from the SAQ instrument, and the safety climate items from the RN4CAST instrument. The 
aim was to investigate whether the factor structure of the SAQ could be replicated in this 
sample, and to see if the items from the RN4CAST survey were included in the hypothesized 
SAQ factors. All items were included in a principal component analysis with oblimin rotation 
and listwise exclusion of missing items. However, the correlation matrix from this analysis 
turned out not to be positive definite. This might be a result of the large amount of missing 
data in this data set, or due to the relatively small sample size.  
Hence, an attempt to perform the analysis again, now with pairwise exclusion of cases, was 
made. The result was the same for this attempt as well. The small sample size and the large 
number of missing data for some items imply that a factor analysis cannot be performed on all 
items in the questionnaire. 
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Thus, an attempt with the dimensions from SAQ that were assumed to have the most similar 
items, and that correlated the most with the composite scales from RN, were included in a 
Principal Component Analysis. In this analysis 19 items, of which 12 items of the SAQ 
instrument and 7 items from the RN4CAST survey, were included.  
As described in chapter 4.2, the first step in a factor analysis is to assess the sample adequacy. 
The results form the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test for sample adequacy was .844, and the 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant.  This implies an adequate sample, and the analysis 
was continued.  
To assess how many factors should be retained, the factors’ eigenvalues were assessed. As 
can be seen from table 9, five factors had an eigenvalue higher than 1. According to the 
Kaiser criterion, only the factors with an eigenvalue higher than 1 should be retained. Thus, 
according to this criterion, five factors could be retained. These five factors accounted for 
42.3 %, 6.8 %, 6.4 %, 6.2 % and 5.2 % of the variance respectively. The Kaiser criterion will 
often result in too many factors being retained. The scree plot was thus inspected (figure 2).  
 
Table 9 Eigenvalues >.1  
Component Initial Eigenvalues 
 Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 8.044 42.334 42.334 
2 1.300 6.840 49.175 
3 1.227 6.458 55.632 
4 1.182 6.219 61.851 
5 1.004 5.282 67.133 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Scree plot 
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As one can see from the scree plot (figure 2), there is a clear break after the first factor. This 
could imply that only one factor should be retained. This was further assessed using a parallel 
analysis (table 10). The results confirmed that the eigenvalue of only one factor exceeded the 
corresponding value for a randomly generated data matrix of the same size (n=19 variables, 
n=53 respondents). To assess if it was possible to perform a PCA analysis on only the items in 
the safety culture dimension from SAQ and the items from RN4CAST, a new parallel 
analysis were performed (n= 15variables, n 53=respondents). The results from this confirmed 
that it is not possible to extract more than one factor with the limited amount of observations 
present (see table 10). This excludes the possibility for assessing whether the factor structure 
in my sample is similar to the factor structure found in other SAQ validation studies, and to 
assess how the RN4CAST items would relate to the SAQ factors.  
 
  
Table 10 Monte Carlo Parallel Analysis 
 
Number of variables 19 15 
Number of subjects 53 53 
Number of replications 100 100 
 Eigenvalue Random 
eigenvalue 
SD Eigenvalue Random 
eigenvalue 
SD 
 1 2,2781 ,1557 1 2,0381 ,1410 
2 1,9643 ,1008 2 1,7833 ,0969 
 
 
 
5.4 Reliability analysis 
5.4.1 Reliability of the composite scales from RN4CAST 
Composite scales of some of the items from RN4CAST/HSOPSC have been created. As 
described in chapter 4, variables measured on a Likert-type scale can be treated as interval-
level data if some assumptions are found to be met. Hence, the creation of the composite 
scales is in large part due to the possibility to treat the data as continuous measures and use 
parametric statistics in the data analysis. The scales are based on own my judgements about 
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the relationship between the items that make up the SAQ dimensions, and a suggestion from a 
researcher at the Knowledge Centre working on the same project this thesis is a part of. The 
two different scaled indexes will both be subject for the same analyses, to see if one scale is a 
better reflection of patient safety climate as measured by the RN4CAST items in relation to 
the SAQ dimensions than the other. As will be described, the composition of the indexes 
varies somewhat, which gives slightly different alpha scores and also correlation to the 
corresponding SAQ dimension. The two scales both demonstrated satisfying internal 
consistency as measured by the Chronbach’s Alpha (see tables 12 and 14). Thus, the scale 
valued highest will then be a matter of how one values internal consistency relative to 
correlation with the criterion variable one wants to compare the scale to. See the discussion 
for a more thorough elaboration of this topic.  
Composite safety climate scale nr 1: RNsafety_1 
The first composite scale is made up of the HSOPSC items “Staff feel like their mistakes 
are held against them”; “Staff feel  free  to  question  the  decisions  or  actions  of  those 
 with  more   authority”; “In  this  unit,  we  discuss  ways  to  prevent  errors  from 
 happening  again” and “We  are  given  feedback  about  changes  put  into  place  based  on 
 event   reports”. This scale is hypothesized to correlate to the SAQ dimensions “safety 
climate”, as the items from the two instruments both addresses perceptions of how errors are 
treated, how feedback is given and how patient safety concerns are treated.  
The relationships between the items in the scale have been assessed with correlation analysis. 
According to Ringdal (2007), one wants to find correlation coefficients of medium strength 
(.30-.60).  As one can see from the inter-item correlation matrix (table 11), there is a positive 
but not too strong correlation between the items in the scale. The correlation coefficients 
range from .458-.591 
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Table 11: Inter-item correlations RNsafety_I 
 Staff feel like 
their mistakes 
are held against them 
Staff feel  free  to 
 question the decisions 
 or  actions  of  those 
 with  more   authority 
In this unit, we  discuss 
 ways  to  prevent  errors 
 from  happening  again 
We are  given  feedback 
about  changes  put  into 
 place  based  on  event   
reports 
Staff feel like their mistakes 
are held against them 
1.000    
Staff feel  free  to  question  the 
 decisions  or  actions  of  those  with 
 more   authority 
.577 1.000   
In this  unit,  we  discuss  ways  to 
 prevent  errors  from  happening 
 again 
.458 .517 1.000  
We  are  given  feedback  about 
 changes  put  into  place  based  on 
 event   reports 
.532 .483 .591 1.000 
 
 
Internal consistency 
Further, the correlation between the individual items and the composite scale has been 
assessed. The correlation is ranging from .627-.652 (see table 12). The Chronbach’s Alpha for 
the scale is .815, and as one can see from the table, it would not increase if any of the items in 
the scale were removed. 
Table 12:Iitem-total correlation and Chronbach’s Alpha if item deleted 
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach’s Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Staff feel like their mistakes are held against 
them 
.627 .772 
Staff feel  free  to  question  the  decisions  or 
 actions  of  those  with  more   authority 
.631 .769 
In this  unit,  we  discuss  ways  to  prevent 
 errors  from  happening  again 
.634 .768 
We  are  given  feedback  about  changes  put 
 into  place  based  on  event   reports 
.653 .758 
Chronbach’s Alpha scale: .815  
Average correlation between items in scale: .63  
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Composite safety climate scale nr 2: RNsafety_II 
The second composite scale, which also is hypothesized to correspond to the SAQ dimension 
“safety climate”, contains the items “Staff feel like their mistakes are held against them”; 
“Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes”; “Things 
“fall between the cracks” when transferring patients from one unit to another”; “In this unit, 
we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again” and “We are given feedback about 
 changes put into place based on event reports”. Here, one item, which regards the 
information flow between shifts, has been included. Further, one item included in the 
previously described scale is removed, namely “Staff feel free to question 
the decisions or actions of those with more authority”.  
As can bee seen from table 13, most items have a moderate correlation to each other, which is 
what one would want to find. One item however, demonstrates weak correlation to two other 
items, namely “Things “fall between the crack” when patients are transferred from one ward 
to another”. These are highlighted in bold in the table. This item is from the HSOPSC 
dimension “Handoffs and Transitions”. This item relates more to communication between 
wards, which might be the reason for its low correlation to the items relating to 
communication about error, and the presence of a guilt-free environment.   
 
Table 13 Inter-item correlations RNsafety_II 
 Staff feel like 
their mistakes 
are held against 
them 
Important patient 
care information is 
often lost during 
shift changes 
Things “fall between 
the crack” when 
patients are 
transferred from one 
ward to another 
In this unit, we 
discuss ways to 
 prevent  errors 
 from  happening 
 again 
We are given feedback 
about changes put into 
place  based  on  event 
  reports 
Staff feel like their mistakes 
are held against them 
1.000     
Important patient care information 
is often lost during shift changes 
.563 1.000    
Things “fall between the crack” 
when patients are transferred from 
one ward to another 
.222 .414 1.000   
In this  unit,  we  discuss  ways  to 
 prevent  errors  from  happening 
 again 
.459 .462 .416 1.000  
We  are  given  feedback  about 
 changes  put  into  place  based 
 on  event   reports 
.533 .455 .222 .589 1.000 
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Internal consistency  
The correlation between the individual items and the composite scale has been assessed also 
for this scale (see table 14). The correlation is fairly good, ranging from .606-.648. However, 
one item demonstrates a lower correlation, at .406.  Chronbach’s Alpha for the scale is .796. 
The item demonstrating lowest correlation would also increase the Chronbach’s Alpha to .804 
if the item were removed. This is the same item as having low correlation in the inter-item 
correlation matrix seen above (table 14).  Hence, this item is removed in the following 
analyses. 
 
Table 14 Item-total correlation and Chronbach’s if item deleted 
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Staff feel like their mistakes are held against 
them 
.606 .750 
Important patient care information is often lost 
during shift changes 
.624 .742 
Things “fall between the crack” when patients 
are transferred from one ward to another 
.406 .804 
In this  unit,  we  discuss  ways  to  prevent 
 errors  from  happening  again 
.648 .734 
We  are  given  feedback  about  changes  put 
 into  place  based  on  event   reports 
.612 .746 
Chronbach’s Alpha scale: .796  
Average correlation between items in scale: .601 
 
 
5.5 Concurrent validity assessment   
Concurrent validity refers to the degree that the results from the instrument match results from 
an already validated instrument. This will be assessed using the Pearsons correlation 
coefficient and the intraclass correlation cofficient (ICC2) 
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5.5.1 Pearsons product-moment correlation coefficient 
The relationship between patient safety climate measured by SAQ and by the two composite 
safety scales I constructed from RN4CAST was investigated using the Pearsons product-
moment correlation coefficient, and Spearman`s rho. Preliminary analyses were performed to 
assess violations of the assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity (constant 
variance). The results demonstrated a strong, positive correlation between the SAQ safety 
dimension and the two RN safety composite scales (see table 15). The correlation appears to 
be larger using the parametric alternative than the non-parametric. Hence, the chance of 
underestimating the strength of the relationship between the safety climate scales due to non-
linearity seems to be small.  
 
Table 15 Spearman`s rho and Pearson`s correlation coefficients 
 SAQ safety 
climate 
RNsafety_I RNsafety_II 
Spearman's rho      SAQ safety climate 
Sig. (2.tailed)  
N                
1 
 
58 
  .632** 
.000 
54 
.688** 
.000 
53 
Pearson`s correlation 
coefficient   
SAQ safety climate 
Sig. (2.tailed)  
N                
  1 
 
58 
.734** 
.000 
54 
                          .782** 
.000 
53 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2.tailed) 
 
The coefficient of determinant (r2) was then calculated for the two variables, using the 
Pearson`s r. r2 ) =.54 and r2 2) =.61 This gives that the SAQ safety climate variable accounts 
for 54 % and 61 % of variability in RNsafety_I and RNsafety_II variables, respectively.  
5.5.2 Intraclass correlation 
The intraclass correlation coefficient was estimated in order to assess the degree of 
consistency between how safety climate is judged in the two instruments. The range for an 
intraclass correlation coefficient is similar to other coefficients, it can vary between 0.0 and.0. 
An ICC value close to 1 implies that the values in the two variables or scales are similar.  
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ICC2 SAQ safety climate and RNsafety_I 
The intraclass correlation coefficient with a two-way random model, using single measures 
(ICC2), gave an intraclass correlation coefficient of .73 (95% C.I .583-.836). The consistency 
of raters are assessed, not the absolute agreement.  
ICC2 SAQ safety climate and RNsafety_II 
The same model was applied to the second scale from the RN4CAST survey, RNsafety_II. 
Here, the ICC2 for single measures were .78 (95% C.I .642-.864).  
5.5.3 Assessment of agreement 
Figure 3 Bland-Altman plot SAQ safety climate and Rnsafety_I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Bland-Altman plot SAQ safety climate and Rnsafety_II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen from the two scatter plots above (figure 3 and 4), there is a quite evenly 
distribution of observations across the plots. The RNsafety climate scale II has a somewhat 
higher mean difference than the RNsafety_I (6.9 and 4.8, respectively). It seems that there is a 
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tendency to score the SAQ safety climate dimension somewhat higher than both the RNsafety 
composite scales (as the mean for both is a positive value). The limits of agreement for the 
two measures are quite high (-22.6 to 32.2 and -17.1 to 30.8, respectively). This could imply 
that the variation between individual scores of the two scales is somewhat high. However, as 
very few data points fall outside the limits of agreement, and as the data points are evenly 
distributed across the plots, the agreement between the two measurement instruments are 
found to be good.  
In order to investigate whether variables assumed to predict safety climate in fact would do so 
in this sample as well, a regression analysis was attempted with the different scales as 
dependent variable and individual items from the survey as independent variables. However, 
as one can see from the p-p plot of standardized residuals (figure 5), there is a clear tendency 
for column distribution. This can imply that the assumption of continuity is not met when 
single items are used in the analysis, and a linear regression model cannot be performed on 
this data set.  
Figure 5 Normal p-p plot of regression standardized residual   
 
 
Based on the assessment of internal consistency, reliability and concurrent validity in relation 
to the SAQ safety climate dimensions, the two scales have been validated for use as measures 
for safety climate, and are valid measures of nurses` perceptions of patient safety climate in 
the RN4CAST survey. The level of agreement between the SAQ safety climate dimension 
and the two scales are reasonably good. One scale (RNsafety_I) demonstrates higher internal 
consistency and agreement with SAQ safety climate, whereas the other (RNsafety_II) are 
found to correlate to SAQ somewhat higher.  
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6 Discussion 
In the following sections, the statistical findings will be discussed in relation to the research 
question presented in the introduction, and some general conclusions regarding the research 
question will be drawn. Then, the relationship between safety climate surveys and safety 
performance will be discussed in relation to the aims and results of this study. Finally, some 
concluding comments will be made on the second topic assessed in this thesis, based on the 
theoretical findings from the literature.  
 
6.1 General conclusions 
The initial aim of this study was to investigate the association between process variables 
measured as the number of hand hygiene situations performed satisfactory (in the WHO`s 
Clean Care is Safer Care framework), and patient safety climate. However, due to the 
limitations imposed by the sample size, it was not possible to assess this further. Hence, the 
only assessment undertaken is whether items from the RN4CAST survey could be used as 
valid measures of Norwegian nurses` perceptions of patient safety climate. The internal 
consistency and the concurrent validity of the two composite scales have been found to be 
satisfactory, as have the agreement in measurement between the criterion variable (SAQ 
safety climate) and the two composite scales.  
However, the results come with a number of caveats. The sample size, instruments, and 
methods used all have challenges and shortcomings, which will be discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
6.2 Methods and instruments 
As the sample did not allow for an exploratory factor analysis, we were left with correlation 
analysis to assess whether there was an association between the items from the two surveys 
relating to patient safety climate. This gives a level of uncertainty regarding both whether the 
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SAQ factor structure would be replicated in this sample, and how the items from RN4CAST 
relate to the different dimensions in the SAQ. 
Deilkås and Hofoss (2008) have distributed the SAQ in a Norwegian hospital using the same 
six-item Likert-type scale. They found a missing items rate at between 0-13%, with a mean of 
2.9%. This is considerably lower than in this survey. As the purpose of this survey not was to 
assess the safety climate at the units, and as neither the dimensions “perceptions of unit 
management” nor “perceptions of hospital management” have been used in the statistical 
analyses, the problem of a vast number of missing items is not at considerable as it could have 
been. The reason for the high number of missing values in the dimension “perceptions of 
hospital management” is the response category “don’t know” (DK). The number of non-
responses is never higher than two for any of the items. Thus, there was clearly a tendency to 
use the response option “don’t know” instead of making a judgment of the performance of the 
hospital management. The reason behind this reluctance to score the hospital management 
could be that it is perceived to be a remote entity, which has little perceived impact on the 
day-to-day activities at the unit level. It could also be that the frontline staff just does not have 
an opinion on, or enough information about, how the hospital management performs. Only 
26.5% of the respondents gave positive responses to the dimension “perception of hospital 
management”, whereas 42.5 % gave positive responses to the dimension “perceptions of unit 
management”. The number of DK responses was lower for the latter dimension (n=15, 20%, 
and n=24, 34.4%, respectively). The unit management may be perceived as closer in the 
organisation, and there is likely more contact between the unit management and the frontline 
workers. This could be the reason both for the better assessment and the higher number of 
respondents reporting an opinion on these items.  
6.2.1 Measurement caveats  
The different rating scales in this survey could be a serious concern for the validity of the 
findings.  For the purpose of comparing the two instruments, it would have been a great 
advantage to use the same rating scale in both. The items from the RN4CAST survey (from 
HSOPSC) have either 6 or 7.5% missing items. Here, responses are given along a 5-point 
Likert-type scale, and the sixth response option is not included. Hence, all missing values are 
non-responses. We do not know how respondents value the 5-point Likert-type scale in 
relation to the 6-point Likert-type scale prior to the RN4CAST items. Survey design and 
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response theory is a rather large field in psychology, which is outside the scope of this thesis 
to assess. However, the different rating scales should be kept in mind for the interpretation of 
the results. There could be systematic differences in how these scales are perceived when 
responding to the survey, and this is a shortcoming of the design of this survey. One cannot 
exclude the possibility of this being the cause of the somewhat different scores for the SAQ 
safety climate scale, and the two composite safety scales created. It could have been better to 
remove the sixth response option in this survey, as the purpose was to validate the items from 
RN4CAST, and to have all answers on the same scale could have reduced the level of 
uncertainty regarding the results somewhat. However, SAQ has been validated in Norway 
using the six-level response format, and it could be problematic to remove one response 
option without further assessment of how this could affect the results.  
The way the instruments differentiate between unit, ward and hospital might be a problem, as 
we do not know what the respondents have in mind when they are responding to the items. 
The HSOPSC is divided into either unit or hospital-level dimensions. The generic version of 
the SAQ does not differentiate the dimensions in this way. Most of the items ask for 
perceptions of patient safety climate “here”. Hence, besides from the two dimensions of 
perceptions of unit and hospital management, one does not actually know what respondents 
are answering to. It could either be perception of unit or hospital-wide aspects of patient 
safety. This could be a second explanation for the differences in scores between the SAQ 
safety climate dimension and the two composite safety scales, as the items from HSOPSC 
does not contain the same level of uncertainty regarding the different levels in the 
organisation.  
As described in section 3.6, an especially problematic aspect of using self-reported outcome 
measures collected in the same instrument as the safety climate variables relates to mono-
method bias. This could be caused by an artifactual covariance between the predictor variable 
and the criterion variable, as the respondents providing the measures of both variables are the 
same. In this study the most likely sources for mono method bias arises from the fact that the 
criterion variable and predictor variable is measured at the same point in time. Both SAQ and 
RN4AST items are included in a single questionnaire. To overcome this, one could have 
administered the different instruments at two points in time. This may have resulted in a lower 
response rate, however, and also risk the assessments to change. Due to the small sample size, 
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increasing the response rate is considered the most important aspect, and administration of the 
questionnaire once is chosen.  
 The respondents did not know that some items in the questionnaire would be used to validate 
other items. Hence, they had no reason to make inferences about how an eventual relationship 
between the items was assumed to be. Due to this fact, respondents’ implicit theories about 
relationships is not regarded a potential source for common method bias in this study. What 
could be a source of bias, however, is the respondents’ cognitive need to respond to items in a 
consistent way. The predictive and the criterion items relate to the same underlying construct. 
Unfortunately, as the methods for adjusting for mono method bias in large part involve factor 
analysis, it was not possible to adjust for this type of bias in this study. When interpreting the 
relationship between these scales, one should keep this in mind.  
6.2.2 Outcome variables 
One of the initial aims was to investigate the predictive validity of the different safety scales 
in relation to the outcome measures included in this survey. It would then have been possible 
to detect eventual differences between the SAQ safety climate scale and the two composite 
scales created, if one were better in predicting the outcome variables. However, as we would 
have to use single items from the SAQ instrument, and single outcome measures from 
RN4CAST, a linear regression analysis were not allowed for by the data available.  Ideally, in 
order to treat the items as continuous data, there should have been more observations. The 
limitations of the sample size became increasingly evident when an attempt was made on 
regression analysis.  The p-p plot and the scatter plot of the standardized residuals clearly 
indicated that the independent variables (which were single items) were not data measured on 
a continuous scale, as a distinct column pattern could be seen (se figure 4). Ideally, further 
investigation of hypothesized predictors for patient safety climate as well as the predictive 
validity of the different scales should have been carried out, for example using logistic 
regression to account for the ordinal level data.  
However, even if we were able to use the nurse-reported outcome variables provided in this 
study, it might not have allowed us to draw valid conclusions about the predictive validity of 
the different scales. As previously described, a number of systematic measurement errors 
could be present when the predictive variable and the outcome variable are measured at the 
same point of time, using the same instrument.  
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 Further, it might not be reasonable to use self-reported outcome measures in the analyses, 
neither for predictive validity nor for assessment of causality between safety climate and 
outcomes. Hard, clinical data from reliable sources would give the most accurate picture of 
the state of patient safety. However, as such high-quality reporting systems in many cases are 
lacking, or, as discussed, are present only for organisations as a whole, one would in many 
cases have to rely on less accurate and valid outcome measures, such as health-care worker-
reported outcome measures.  
The HSOPSC instrument, which is one of the most frequently used instrument for assessing 
safety climate, includes four outcome measures. The health-care workers are for example 
asked to give a score to the overall safety climate and to estimate how many errors have been 
reported. These self-reported outcome measures are then used in the analyses (see for 
example Sarac, Flin, Mearns and Jackson, (2011). In the RN4CAST survey, respondents are 
asked to score a number of different patient outcomes, such as the frequency of medication 
errors, the frequency of pressure ulcers, and how often various hospital-acquired infections 
occur. It could be problematic to use these assessments as measures of patient safety, and it 
should in any case be accompanied by a discussion of potential sources for mono method 
bias. It is not without problems to use self-reported outcome measures in quality and safety 
assessments. A number of aspects can result in unreliable outcome measures if this approach 
is used. Some have origins in psychological theory, where it is well known that 
underreporting of negative events is common (for an example in health care, see Thomas and 
Petersen, (2003).  The same points discussed earlier about mono method bias apply for the 
use of outcome measures gathered in the same instrument and at the same point in time as 
explanatory variables. It could result in erroneous correlations if some of the common 
variance between these variables is in fact due to the measurement methods. While some call 
for the need of linking safety climate survey results to objective derived outcome measures 
(Blegen et a., 2009), none of the studies investigated here have discussed common method 
variance as a possible source of measurement error.  
6.3 Safety climate and its relation to quality 
It could easily be argued that quality of health care is something more than treating patients in 
a safe way. Safety is an important aspect of quality, but the nature of the relationship between 
these two terms is more contested. When do quality issues turn into safety issues? It is 
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important to have clear definitions and operationalisations if these terms are supposed to be 
used in research, but as of now there are not consensual agreements on these definitions. Nor 
is there agreement on what constitutes an adverse event, what an error is, and if harm needs to 
occur before the event is important (Lilford et al, 2003; Vincent, 2010).  
As previously described, both the SAQ and the HSOPSC have been found to have good 
psychometric properties, their factor structure have been replicated in different samples (with 
minor modifications), they have been found to be reliable and valid in a number of countries 
and they are of the two most widely used instruments to measure health care workers’ 
perceptions of the safety climate they are a part of. However, few attempts to establish a link 
between the safety climate and safety outcomes, as measured either as patient outcomes, 
health care worker outcomes, or structural outcomes, have found a causal relationship 
between safety climate and outcomes. Does it matter if the questionnaires are reliable and 
valid, if patient safety climate cannot be linked to safety outcomes? Are they then useful? 
Many researchers have concluded their work by calling for more research on this topic, and as 
of now, these questions stand without an empirically derived answer.  
6.3.1 Lack of explicit theoretical framework 
As described in chapter 2, there is no consensus on which theoretical framework best explains 
the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes. This implies that what is 
regarded the most important aspects of a good safety climate varies between studies. Hence, a 
number of explanatory variables and safety climate dimensions are included in the different 
studies. While it is possible to identify the main theoretical approach from the items included 
in the instruments, the lack of coherence can result in a fragmented and non-transparent body 
of research regarding the theoretical associations between safety climate and outcomes 
(Wakefield et al., 2010). This could be a reflection of the fact that the constitutive dimensions 
and most important facets of safety culture seems to not be fully understood. Very few of the 
studies have stated an hypothesized causal model that could contribute in explaining how this 
relationship actually is (Jackson, Sarac and Flin, (2010). As Hearld et al (2008) suggest, the 
lack of theory-driven research reduces the possibilities for the accumulation of knowledge and 
progression in the patient safety climate field. This lack of theoretic explicitness could hinder 
researchers and others working with patient safety improvements to effectively communicate 
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about strategies for safety improvements. It certainly can make this communication process 
less accurate and transparent.  
6.3.2 Direct causal relationship, circular causation or just co-
variation? 
There are few studies that aim at directly investigating this link - how improving safety 
climate is assumed to improve patient outcomes (The Health Foundation, 2011a). Some 
studies even finds that improving certain process outcomes such as error reporting rate may 
well happen without a corresponding improvement in safety climate. It could be that the 
changes in patient outcomes are causing the change in safety climate, rather than the other 
way around. Further, there is possible that there is an interrelationship between patient and 
staff outcomes, and safety climate – they could all influence each other. (Ibid.). In many 
cases, while trying to establish a causal link between safety climate and patient outcomes, the 
result is limited to the establishment of simultaneously improvements of safety climate and 
the outcome in question. If we were able to continue with the initial aim of this thesis, it might 
be that the same criticism could have been applied to the results, as observations of hand 
hygiene and assessment of patient safety climate would have taken place simultaneously. 
Hence, we would only have been able to assess the number of opportunities for hand hygiene 
performed satisfactory, and the patient safety climate score. It would not have allowed us to 
assess an eventual causal relationship, as it would have been a cross-sectional study.  
 
6.4 Strengths  
The survey performed is, to my knowledge, the only study attempting to establish the validity 
of the RN4CAST questions that relates to patient safety culture. The HSOPSC has been 
validated in many settings, including Norway. Only one study aiming at assessing the 
relationship between SAQ and HSOPSC dimensions have been identified (Etchegaray & 
Thomas, 2012). They found that while the scores from the different instruments could be 
converted, they could not be used exchangeably. They focused their analysis on the different 
scales in the instruments, however, whereas the items included in the RN4CAST survey are 
not from one, single dimension of the HSOPSC instrument; rather it consists of items from 
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several dimensions (see chapter 3.2). This could be a strength in the sense that it includes 
items from HSOPSC that are similar to the SAQ safety climate items, but are not limited to 
the HSOPSC scale perceived to be most similar to the SAQ safety climate dimension. The 
assessment of the internal consistency and concurrent validity of a composite scale of these 
items have enabled researchers working with data from the RN4CAST survey to use these 
items as reliable measures of nurses’ perception of patient safety climate.   
The response rate obtained in this survey is rather high, especially when one recognizes that 
this survey was distributed in the middle of the summer.  This is in many aspects due to the 
efforts from the infection control nurse and the unit representatives, who did a great job at 
motivating the staff, and demonstrating the importance of completing the questionnaire. This 
is especially important due to the small sample in this study.  
 
6.5 Limitations 
As discussed in the previous sections, there are a number of shortcomings and caveats 
following the survey. We were not able to assess the initial aim for the thesis due to these 
limitations, nor were we able to perform a factor analysis. Hence, the statistical analyses have 
to a large degree relied on correlation methods. These methods are useful for measuring the 
general direction of relationships between variables. To account for this, an assessment of 
agreement was conducted. The results from this analysis further supported the conclusion that 
the two scaled indexes are valid measures of patient safety climate. However, this analysis, 
similar to the correlation analysis, requires that the variables be measured on a continuous 
scale. As demonstrated when attempts on linear regression analysis were made, this 
assumption might not be valid, and certainly not when single items are used as independent 
variables. To overcome the problem of continuity, the composite scales have been created. 
While the comparison of the parametric and non-parametric correlation coefficients 
contributed to the conclusion that it was justified to regard the scaled indexes as continuous 
level data, it nonetheless provides a level of uncertainty regarding the results. To overcome 
this, more research could be undertaken with a larger sample, or using categorical (logistic) 
regression analysis.  
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7 Concluding remarks  
Based on results from the statistical analyses performed, and on the face validity assessment 
of the items composing the RN4CAST safety climate scales, it is judged that the items from 
RN4CAST that relates to patient safety aspects can be used as measures of patient safety 
climate, if they are combined into a composite scale. The two different scales created here are 
both reliable and demonstrates good internal consistency. Which one is chosen is dependent 
on how one makes the trade-off between correlation to the criterion measure, and internal 
consistency as measured by Chronbach`s Alpha. Based on the assessment of internal 
consistency, reliability and concurrent validity in relation to the SAQ safety climate 
dimensions, the two scales have been validated for use as measures for safety climate, and are 
valid measures of nurses` perceptions of patient safety climate in the RN4CAST survey.  
Regarding the second topic investigated in this thesis, it has been difficult to find conclusive 
evidence that improvement in safety climate will result in improved safety outcomes. It is 
proposed that the relationship in fact is not directly causational, but more complex, with all 
the variables influencing on each other. However, it may be that due to lack of coherence in 
definitions and terms used to assess and measure safety climate, the number of different 
instruments used for measurement, and the vast number of safety outcomes that have been 
used as end points, one has not been able to demonstrate this causal relationship. It have been 
said before, but more research on this topic is required if the link between safety climate and 
safety outcomes is supposed to be identified and understood. To develop a more coherent and 
consensual theoretical framework will be an ideal starting point, and research in this area is 
needed. Further, more research on the link between both processual, structural and outcome 
variables could be required if a coherent framework for patient safety climate and outcomes 
are to be developed.   
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